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Abstract
A discourse planner for (task-oriented) dialogue must
be able to make choices about whether relevant, but
optional information (for example, the "satellites" in
an RST-based planner) should be communicated. We
claim that eective text planners must explicitly model
aspects of the Hearer's cognitive state, such as what the
hearer is attending to and what inferences the hearer
can draw, in order to make these choices. We argue
that a mere representation of the Hearer's knowledge is
inadequate. We support this claim by (1) an analysis
of naturally occurring dialogue, and (2) by simulating
the generation of discourses in a situation in which we
can vary the cognitive parameters of the hearer. Our
results show that modeling cognitive state can lead to
more eective discourses (measured with respect to a
simple task).
1 Introduction
Text planning is the task for a speaker (S) of deciding
what information to communicate to a hearer (H) and
how and when to communicate it. Over the last few
years a consensus has emerged that the text planning
task should be formulated in terms of communicative
goals or intentions [18, 24, 22]. Consider, for example,
the RST-based planners developed at ISI [13, 20, 14].
These planners use the discourse relations proposed by
Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) [17] as plan oper-
ators, by interpreting the requirements on the related
segments as preconditions, and the resultant eect of
the discourse relation as a postcondition in a traditional
AI planning architecture.
Two types (at least) of discourse relations have been
identied in the literature. A rela-
tion [17] or relation [14] simply reects a
relation that exists independently in the world, such
as causation. Each subject-matter relation can be seen
as a rhetorical strategy for the linguistic realization of
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a range of communicative intentions [21]. A
[17] or relation
[14] holds between two discourse segments such that
the juxtaposition increases H's strength of belief, de-
sire, or intention. Each presentational relation maps
directly to a communicative intention. Examples of
presentational relations include the rela-
tion, which increases H's desire to perform an action,
hopefully persuading H to form an intention to do the
action.
Both subject-matter and presentational relations re-
late two clauses: (1) the which realizes the
main point; and (2) the which is auxiliary
optional information. For example in the
relation shown in Figure 1, the is the belief
which provides motivation to do the action realized by
the proposal or suggestion in the . Since the
informationmay or may not be realized, pre-
vious text planners have run in either verbose or terse
mode, in which either all or no satellite information is
realized [21].
If an approach to text planning based on the notion
of communicative intention is to succeed, it requires
an appropriate representation of communicative goals,
and of all mental states required for reasoning about
these goals. This is especially true in the case of pre-
sentational relations. We can immediately observe that
since such relations aect the degree of strength of H's
belief, desire of intention, we need a gradual representa-
tion of mental attitudes. To our knowledge, no current
text planner uses such a gradual representation. Sec-
ond, it has been widely assumed that a model of what
the hearer knows determines exactly when to include
optional information in verbose mode: include optional
information unless the hearer knows it. However, in our
analysis of a corpus of 55 naturally-occurring dialogues,
information that the hearer knew was frequently real-
ized [34]. Consider the following short natural dialogue,
part of a discussion about which Indian restaurant to
go to for lunch:
(1) a. Listen to Ramesh.
b. He's Indian.
Clearly, S wants to H to accept his pro-
posal with (1b). However, in this situation all of the
discourse participants already knew that Ramesh was
Indian. We hypothesize that Example (1) shows that
there are cognitive processing motivations for S's choice
to include information that is already known to the
hearer, such as (1b), and that a model of H's cognitive
processes are required for a text planner to appropri-
ately decide when to include optional information.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follow.
We start out by describing in more detail the prob-
lem facing text planners based on communicative goals
(Section 2). In Section 3 we briey review cognitive
theories of deliberation and inference and relate these
to an account of working memory. Next, in Section 4 we
present the Design-World experimental environment, in
which we embed our cognitive model. In Section 5, we
present some examples of modeling experiments that
suggest what sort of information S must access in order
to generate ecient discourse. Finally, in Section 6 we
briey discuss possible implications for text planning
architectures.
2 Achieving Communicative Goals
In this paper, we focus on presentational relations, and
we use the relation as a prototypical pre-
sentational discourse relation to illustrate our points.
The relation, whose eect is to increase
H's desire to perform an action, is shown in Figure 1.
We will call the nucleus of the ,
and any information that can serve as the satellite of
we will call a .
What sort of representation is needed in order to use
for discourse planning? The eect of pre-
sentational relations is always to increase H's belief, de-
sire, or intention. Thus we will need (in the case of
) some sort of representation of degree of
desire. In a rst attempt at using , we will
use utility theory [6] and simply associate utilities with
proposed actions. Under this view, an agent's strength
of desire to perform an action is the utility he or she be-
lieves performing the action will yield, where \utility"
is a quantiable variable. In Section 6 we will discuss
the limitations of this approach.
However, even though utility theory can be used as
the theoretical underpinning of the rela-
tion, it will not in general be sucient because it does
not take into account the way in which H's beliefs in-
teract with his attentional state, and the way that H's
cognitive limitations interact with the demands of the
task.
Consider the following scenario. An agent S wants an
agent H to accept a proposal P. In the situation where H
always deliberates and H knows of options which com-
pete with proposal P, H cannot decide whether to ac-
cept P without a warrant.1 Previous work has assumed
1Elsewhere we consider scenarios in which H always ac-
cepts S's proposal without a warrant and in which H never
that the warrant can be omitted if it is already believed
by H. Presumably the speaker in (2) will not say It's
shorter if she believes that the hearer knows that the
Walnut St. route was shorter.
(2) a. Let's walk along Walnut St.
b. It's shorter.
However, consider again (1), repeated here as (3):
(3) a. Listen to Ramesh.
b. He's Indian.
The warrant in (3b) was included despite the fact
that it was common knowledge among the conversants.2
Our hypothesis is that 3 shows that speakers distinguish
between information that H knows and information that
is salient for H [27]. Thus even if H knows a warrant
for adopting S's proposal, if the warrant is not salient
for H, then S may choose to include it with a proposal.
We dene as available in current Working
Memory, referred to below as Attention/Working Mem-
ory or AWM. A model of H's attentional state will
distinguish between those discourse entities and beliefs
which are currently available in working memory, and
thus salient, and those that are not. In Section 3, we in-
troduce an operationalization of AWM and discuss how
S can model what is salient for H.
When a warrant is not , H must either infer
the warrant information, or retrieve it from long term
memory, or obtain it from an external source in order to
evaluate S's proposal. Thus S's communicative choice
as to whether to include the warrant satellite may de-
pend on S's model of H's attentional state. Further-
more, it is possible that, even though the warrant is
not salient, merely a trivial processing eort is required
to retrieve it, so that it is not worth saying. Another
possibility is that processing the warrant utterance re-
quires eort that can be traded o against other pro-
cesses such as retrieval and inference. In other words,
S may decide that it is easier just to say the warrant
rather than require H to infer or retrieve it. We will
call a text planning strategy that always includes the
warrant satellite the Explicit-Warrant strategy.
We see that in addition to S modeling H's knowledge,
H's attentional state and expectations about other as-
pects of H's cognitive processes may also inuence S's
text planning decisions, and S cannot simply represent
H's beliefs as a set of pairs of propositions and associ-
ated utility.3 In sum, the choice is hypothesized to de-
pend on cognitive properties of H, e.g. what H knows,
H's attentional state, and H's processing capabilities, as
well as properties of the task and the communication
channel.
knows of competing options to P [35].
2After inferring the intended relation the hearer still
must decide whether s/he believes that Indians know of good
Indian restaurants [37].
3How S would have access to the necessary information
is a separate issue, briey discussed in Section 6.
relation name:
constraints on Nucleus: presents an action in which H is the actor
unrealized with respect to the context of N
(a proposal in our terminology)
constraints on Satellite: none
constraints on the
Nucleus + Satellite combination: H's comprehending the Satellite increases H's desire to
perform action presented in the Nucleus
the eect: H's desire to perform action presented in the Nucleus is increased
Figure 1: RST denition of Motivation Relation
In this paper, we explore some cognitive issues in-
volved in planning to include satellite information found
in RST presentational relations and the representa-
tional demands that arise for text planning tasks. We
will argue that S must model H's cognitive state in a
much more detailed manner than previously assumed
and put forth a proposal about how S might access the
information required in order to do so. In order to
provide evidence for our claim, we will use the cogni-
tive modeling methodology developed in [34], in which
communicative strategies on the part of S can be repre-
sented and their eects can be empirically tested. This
architecture allows us to identify parameters in H's cog-
nitive state that aect S's communicative decisions and
therefore must be modeled. The simulation/modeling
environment is called Design-World.
3 Modeling Cognitive Limits
In Section 2 we proposed some cognitive factors, mo-
tivated by proposals in naturally occurring dialogue,
that may provide limits on whether agents can opti-
mally deliberate proposed actions or make inferences.
We hypothesized that these factors will determine when
Explicit-Warrant is an eective strategy. Here we
briey present a way of cognitively modeling agents'
limited attention and the relationship of limited atten-
tion to deliberation and inference.
It is well known that human agents have limited at-
tentional capacity [19] and it has been argued that lim-
ited attention plays a major role in theoretical and sci-
entic reasoning [28, 15, 31], ie. in deduction, and belief
and intention deliberation. We hypothesized that Ex-
ample (2) shows that a warrant must be for
both agents in order to be used in deliberation, i.e. for
it to motivate H eectively. This ts with the psy-
chological theories mentioned above, that only salient
beliefs are used in deliberation and inference.
In Design-World, salience is modeled by the AWM
model, adapted from [16]. While the AWM model is ex-
tremely simple, Landauer shows that it can be parame-
terized to t many empirical results on human memory
and learning [2]. AWM consists of a three dimensional
space in which propositions acquired from perceiving
the world are stored in chronological sequence accord-
ing to the location of a moving memory pointer. The
sequence of memory loci used for storage constitutes a
random walk through memory with each locus a xed
distance from the previous one. If items are encoun-
tered multiple times, they are stored multiple times [12].
When an agent retrieves items from memory, search
starts from the current pointer location and spreads
out in a spherical fashion. Search is restricted to a
particular search radius: radius is dened in Hamming
distance. For example if the current memory pointer
locus is (0 0 0), the loci distance 1 away would be (0
1 0), (0 -1 0), (0 0 1), (0 0 -1), (-1 0 0), and (1 0 0).
The actual locations are calculated modulo the memory
size. The limit on the search radius denes the capacity
of attention/working memory and hence denes which
stored beliefs and intentions are .
The radius of the search sphere in the AWM model
is used as the parameter for Design-World agents'
resource-bound on attentional capacity. In the exper-
iments below, memory is 16x16x16 and the radius pa-
rameter varies between 1 and 16. Agents with an AWM
of 1 have access to 7 loci, and since propositions are
stored sparsely, they only remember the last few propo-
sitions that they acquired from perception. Agents with
an AWM of 16 can access everything they know.4
The AWM model also gives us a way to measure (1)
the number of retrievals from memory in terms of the
number of locations searched to nd a proposition; (2)
the number of inferences that the agents make as they
means-end reason and draw content-based inferences;
and (3) the number of messages that the agents send to
one another as they carry out the dialogue. The amount
of eort required for each of these cognitive processes
are parameters of the model. These cost parameters
support modeling various cognitive or text planning ar-
chitectures, e.g. varying the cost of retrieval models
4The size of memory was determined as adequate for
producing the desired level of variation in the current task
across all the experimental variables, while still making it
possible to run a large number of simulations involving
agents with access to all of their memory in a reasonable
amount of time. In order to use the AWM model in a dier-
ent task, the experimenter might want to explore dierent
sizes for memory.
dierent assumptions about memory. Since these cog-
nitive processes are the primitives involved in text plan-
ning, this framework can be used to model many dier-
ent architectures rather than the results being specic
to a particular text-planning architecture.
The retrieval parameter alone allows us to model
many dierent assumptions about memory. For exam-
ple, if retrieval is free then all items in working memory
are instantly accessible, as they would be if they were
stored in registers with fast parallel access. If AWM
is set to 16, but retrieval isn't free, the model approxi-
mates slow spreading activation that is quite eortful,
yet the agent still has the ability to access all of mem-
ory, given enough time. If AWM is set lower than 16
and retrieval isn't free, then we model slow spreading
activation with a timeout when eort exceeds a certain
amount, so that an agent does not have the ability to
access all of memory. Thus the AWM parameter sup-
ports a distinction between an agent's ability to access
all the information stored in its memory, and the eort
involved in doing so.
It does not make sense to x absolute values for the
retrieval, inference and communication cost parame-
ters in relation to human processing. However, Design-
World supports exploring issues about the relative costs
of various processes. These relative costs might vary de-
pending on the language that the agents are communi-
cating with, properties of the communication channel,
how smart the agents are, how much time they have,
and what the demands of the task are [23]. Below we
vary the relative cost of communication and retrieval.
The advantages of the AWM model is that it has
been shown to reproduce, in simulation, many results
on human memory and learning. Because search starts
from the current pointer location, items that have been
stored most recently are more likely to be retrieved,
predicting recency eects [2]. Because items that are
stored in multiple locations are more likely to be re-
trieved, the model predicts frequency eects [16]. Be-
cause items are stored in chronological sequence, the
model produces natural associativity eects [1].
The overall agent architecture is modeled on the
IRMA agent architecture [3] with the addition of AWM.
See Figure 2. As Figure 2 shows, AWM interacts with
other processing because deliberation and means-end
reasoning only operate on salient beliefs. This means
that limits in AWM produces a concomitant inferen-
tial limitation, i.e. if a belief is not salient it cannot be
used in deliberation or means-end-reasoning. Thus mis-
takes that agents make in their planning process have a
plausible cognitive basis. Agents can both fail to access
a belief that would allow them to produce an optimal
plan, as well as make a mistake in planning if a belief
about how the world has changed as a result of planning
is not salient. Depending on the preceding discourse,
and the agent's attentional capacity, the propositions
that an agent knows may or may not be salient when a
proposal is made [27].
PLAN LIBRARY
DESIRES
PERCEPTION  OF
    MESSAGES
INTENTIONS
MEANS-ENDS REASONER
ATTENTION/WORKING MEMORY (AWM)
BELIEFS
BELIEF DELIBERATION
ACTIONS
(mediated by dialogue strategies)
COMMUNICATIVE
ENVIRONMENT
intentions
options
options
surviving options
INTENTION DELIBERATION
COMPATIBILITY FILTER
FILTERING MECHANISM
Figure 2: Design-World version of the IRMA Agent Ar-
chitecture for Resource-Bounded Agents with Limited
Attention (AWM)
4 Experimental Environment:
Design-World
Design-World is an experimental environment for test-
ing the relationship between ways of realizing com-
municative intentions and agents' cognitive capabili-
ties, similar to the single-agent TileWorld simulation
environment [25, 11]. Design-World agents can be
parametrized as to discourse strategy, e.g. whether to
use the Explicit-Warrant strategy, and the eects of
this strategy can be measured against a range of cog-
nitive and task parameters. In Section 4.1, we describe
the Design-World domain and task. In Section 4.2, we
describe two alternate discourse strategies. In Section
4.3, we discuss how performance is evaluated and com-
pared. Finally, in Section 5 we present the experimental
results.
4.1 Design World Domain and Task
The Design-World task requires two agents to carry out
a dialogue in order to negotiate an agreement on the de-
sign of the oor plan of a two room house [29, 38]. The
plan requires the agents to agree on how
to and . At the begin-
ning of the simulation, both agents know the structure
of the plan. Each agent has 12 items
of furniture that can be used in the plan, with utility
scores ranging from 10 to 56. A potential nal design
plan negotiated via a (simulated) dialogue is shown in
Figure 3.
ROOM # 1 ROOM # 2
DESIGN WORLD COLLABORATIVE PLAN: 434 points
KEY:
G F
F
P
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P
G
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F = FUCHSIA
G = GREEN
P= PURPLE
55
53
55
56
55
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Figure 3: One Final State for Design-World Standard
Task: Represents the Collaborative Plan Achieved by
the Dialogue, 434 points
Negotiating an agreement consists of a cycle in which:
(1) individual agents perform means-end reasoning
about to use various furniture pieces that they
have in the oor plan; (2) individual agents deliberate
about which options are preferable; (3) then agents use
the identied as the content of to
other agents to a piece of furniture into one of the
rooms; (4) then these proposals are or
by the other agent, or acceptance/rejection is
postponed by a .
Dialogue (4) illustrates agents' communication for
part of designing room-1. Both the articial language
that the agents communicate with and a gloss generated
from that language in italics are shown:5
(4) 1: BILL: Let's put the green rug in the study.
(propose agent-bill agent-kim option-10: put-act
(agent-bill green rug room-1))
2: KIM: Then, let's put the green lamp there.
(propose agent-kim agent-bill option-33: put-act
(agent-kim green lamp room-1))
3: BILL: Next, let's put the green couch in the study.
(propose agent-bill agent-kim option-45: put-act
(agent-bill green couch room-1))
4: KIM: No, instead let's put the purple couch in the
study.
(reject agent-kim agent-bill option-56: put-act (agent-
kim purple couch room-1))
On receiving a proposal, an agent deliberates whether
to or the proposal [6]. Each furniture
5The generation of the gloss was not a focus of this study
and was done via adhoc methods.
item has a value that contributes to an evaluation of
the nal plan. The values on the furniture items range
from 10 to 56, and both agents' furniture items range
over these values. Agents know the values of all the
furniture items at the beginning of the dialogue. The
values of the furniture items are used to the
agents to a proposal, as well as providing a
way of objectively evaluating agents' performance. In
other words, we dene each potential action to have an
associated ; agents can evaluate whether their
desire to do an action is increased by comparing the
score of the proposed action with other actions that
they know about.
For example, at the beginning of the dialogue, Agent-
Kim has stored in memory the proposition that (score
green-rug 56). When she receives Bill's proposal as
shown in (4-1), she evaluates that proposal in order to
decide whether to accept or reject it. As part of evalu-
ating the proposal she will attempt to retrieve the score
proposition stored earlier in memory. Thus the proposi-
tions about the scores of furniture items are
for supporting deliberation.
Agents a proposal if deliberation leads them
to believe that they know of a better option. For exam-
ple, in (4-4) Kim rejects the proposal in (4-3), for pur-
suing option-45, and proposes option-56 instead. The
form of the rejection as a counter-proposal is based on
observations about how rejection is communicated in
naturally-occurring dialogue as codied in the
[36].
Proposals 1 and 2 are inferred to be implicitly
because they are not rejected [36]. If a pro-
posal is , either implicitly or explicitly, then
the option that was the content of the proposal becomes
a mutual intention that contributes to the nal design
plan [26, 33, 29].
The model of AWM discussed above plays a critical
role in determining agents' performance. Remember
that only salient beliefs can be used in means-end rea-
soning and deliberation, so that if the warrant for a
proposal is not salient, the agent cannot properly eval-
uate a proposal.
4.2 Varying Discourse Strategies
Agents are parametrized for dierent discourse strate-
gies by placing dierent expansions of discourse plans in
their plan libraries. In Design-World the only discourse
plans required are plans for , ,
, , and .
The only variations discussed here are variations in the
expansions of .
The All-Implicit strategy is an expansion of a dis-
course plan to make a , in which a
decomposes trivially to the communicative act of
. In dialogue (4), both Design-World agents com-
municate using the All-Implicit strategy, and propos-
als are expanded to the communicative acts
shown in 1, 2, and 3 in dialogue (4). The All-Implicit
strategy never includes warrants in proposals, leaving
it up to the other agent to retrieve them from memory.
The Explicit-Warrant strategy expands the
discourse act to be a followed by a
utterance [32].6 Since agents already know
the point values for pieces of furniture, warrants are al-
ways optional in the experiments here. In RST terms,
an agent with the Explicit-Warrant strategy always
chooses to every proposal. For example (5-1)
is a for the proposal in (5-2):
(5) 1: TED: Putting in the green rug is worth 56.
(say agent-ted agent-ben bel-10: score (option-10:
put-act (agent-ted green rug room-1) 56))
2: TED: So, let's put the green rug in the study.
(propose agent-ted agent-ben option-10: put-act
(agent-ted green rug room-1))
3: BEN: Putting in the green lamp is worth 55.
(say agent-ben agent-ted bel-34: score (option-33:
put-act (agent-ben green lamp room-1) 55))
4: BEN: So, let's put the green lamp in the study.
(propose agent-ben agent-ted option-33: put-act
(agent-ben green lamp room-1))
The fact that the green rug is worth 56 points is mo-
tivation for adopting the intention of putting the green
rug in the study. Whether it is good motivation de-
pends on what other options the agent knows about and
what their utilities are. The Explicit-Warrant strategy
models naturally occurring examples such as those in
2 because the score information used by the hearer to
deliberate whether to accept or reject the proposal is
already mutually believed.
4.3 Evaluating Performance
Remember that we incorporate cognitive modeling into
Design-World so that attentional capacity and the cost
of various cognitive processes are parameters. To eval-
uate , we compare the Explicit-Warrant
strategy with the All-Implicit strategy while we vary
agents' attentional capacity, and the cost of retrieval,
inference and communication. Evaluation of the result-
ing plan is parametrized by (1)
: cost of sending a message; (2) : cost
of inference; and (3) : cost of retrieval from
memory:
= Task Dened
{ (  total messages)
{ (  total inferences)
{ (  total retrievals)
is task specic: in the Standard task
we simply summarize the point values of the furniture
pieces in each in the nal design.
6The ordering of these two acts as given lets us have a
simple control regime for processing utterances. The reverse
ordering would require the agent to check whether it has
more messages before processing the current message.
We simulate 100 dialogues at each parameter set-
ting for each strategy. Because the AWM model is
probabilistic, the agents do not perform identically on
each trial, and their performance over the 100 dialogues
denes a performance distribution. In order to com-
pare two strategies, we test whether the dierences in
the performance distributions are signicant, using the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) two sample test [30].
A strategy A is as compared to a strat-
egy B, for a set of xed parameter settings, if the
dierence in distributions using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov two sample test is signicant at p < .05,
in the positive direction, for two or more AWM
settings.
A strategy is if the dierences go in
the negative direction. Strategies may be neither
or , there may be no dierence
between two strategies.
5 Experimental Results on Providing
Motivation
This section discusses a few experimental results on the
Explicit-Warrant discourse strategy, which we compare
with the All-Implicit strategy. Here we simply test the
eect of whether the warrant is salient or not, whether
there is any processing eort associated with retrieving
the warrant from long term memory, and whether the
cost of processing an utterance is high.
Dierences in performance between the Explicit-
Warrant strategy and the All-Implicit strategy are
shown via a such as Figure 4. In Fig-
ure 4 performance dierences are plotted on the Y-axis
and AWM settings are shown on the X-axis. If the plot
is above the dotted line for 2 or more AWM settings,
then the Explicit-Warrant strategy may be .
Each point represents the dierence in the means of 100
runs of each strategy at a particular AWM setting.
5.1 Explicit Warrant reduces Retrievals
Dialogues in which one or both agents use the Explicit-
Warrant strategy are more ecient when retrieval has
a cost.
Figure 4 shows that the Explicit-Warrant strategy is
detrimental at AWM of 3,4,5 for the Standard task, in
comparison with the All-Implicit strategy, if retrieval
from memory is free (KS 3,4,5 > .19, p < .05). This
is because making the warrant salient displaces infor-
mation about other pieces when agents are attention-
limited.
However, Figure 5 shows that Explicit-Warrant is
benecial when retrieval has an associated processing
cost. By AWM values of 3, performance with Explicit-
Warrant is better than All-Implicit because the war-
rants intended to motivate the hearer and used by the
hearer in deliberation are made salient with each pro-
posal (KS for AWM of 3 and above > .23, p < .01). At
AWM parameter settings of 16, where agents have the
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Figure 4: If Retrieval is Free, Explicit-Warrant is detri-
mental at AWM of 3,4,5: Strategy 1 of two Explicit-
Warrant agents and strategy 2 of two All-Implicit
agents: Task = Standard, commcost = 1, infcost =
1, retcost = 0
ability to search a huge belief space for beliefs to be used
as warrants, the saving in processing time is substan-
tial. Again at the lowest AWM settings, the strategy
is not benecial because it displaces information about
other pieces from AWM. However in Figure 5, in con-
trast with Figure 4, retrieval has an associated cost.
Thus the savings in retrieval balance out with the loss
of raw score so that the strategy is not .
5.2 Explicit Warrant is detrimental if
Communication is Expensive
Finally we can amplify the results shown in Figure 4 by
positing that in addition to there being no processing
eort for retrieving from memory, processing the ad-
ditional warrant utterance requires a lot of processing
eort. Figure 6 shows that if communication cost is 10,
and inference and retrieval are free, then the Explicit-
Warrant strategy is (KS for AWM 1 to
5 > .23, p< .01). This is because the Explicit-Warrant
strategy increases the number of utterances required to
perform the task; it doubles the number of messages
in every proposal. If communication is expensive com-
pared to retrieval, processing additional warrant utter-
ances is highly detrimental if there would be no eort
involved in retrieving them, i.e., if they are essentially
already salient.
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Figure 5: Retrieval costs: Strategy 1 is two Explicit-
Warrant agents and strategy 2 is two All-Implicit
agents: Task = Standard, commcost = 1, infcost =
1, retcost = .01
6 Implications for Text Planning
The experiments reported in the previous section show
that there is a direct relation between H's attentional
state and the advisability of including warrants in a text
plan. There are two ways in which we have modeled
dierent aspects of H's attentional state in the experi-
ments reported in the previous sections: we have var-
ied the cost of retrieval, and we have varied the size of
AWM.We can think of H's attentional state as compris-
ing a (small) active working memory, and a larger long-
term memory. We vary whether an agent has the ability
to retrieve an item by varying the radius of AWM. We
vary the amount of eort involved in retrieving an item
by varying the cost of retrieval [16, 23, 2]. If a warrant
for the proposal is in short-term memory and can be
accessed virtually cost-free, then Figure 4 shows that
generating the warrant explicitly can actually be detri-
mental, since it can displace other information. The ef-
fect is further magnied if communication is very costly,
as shown in Figure 6. (Cost of communication may by
increased by a large number of factors, such as the lin-
guistic complexity of the generated message, the fact
that H is not fully competent in the language of com-
munication, or noise in the channel of communication.)
Thus, if S knows that information that can serve as
a warrant is salient to H, then no warrant should be
generated. On the other hand, if a cost is in fact as-
sociated with retrieval, as in the experiment reported
cost - ted-ben bill-kim C= 10 , I = 0 , R = 0
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Figure 6: If Communication is Expensive: Communica-
tion costs can dominate other costs in dialogues. Strat-
egy 1 is two Explicit-Warrant agents and strategy 2 is
two All-Implicit agents: Task = Standard, commcost =
10, infcost = 0, retcost = 0
in Figure 5, then we can see that generating a warrant
is benecial, especially as the size of AWM increases
and agents have the ability to access all of long term
memory.
We conclude that for a text planner to decide whether
or not to communicate certain non-essential informa-
tion, such as a warrant as part of a relation,
depends not just on the eect of the relation (which
must of course match the discourse goal), but also on
the attentional state of H, and on the other factors such
as the cost of communication. A maximally ecient
text planner will need to have access to:
 a model of H's attentional state;
 an algorithm that, given the attentional state model
and additional parameters such as the costs of
communication and retrieval determines whether H
knows accessible information which can serve as a
warrant.
Here \accessible information" means either that the
information is already salient or that it can be retrieved
at a reasonable cost, given the costs of communication
and retrieval. If we assume that the algorithm denes
a binary predicate NOT-ACCESSIBLE, we can for-
malize the RST relation as a plan operator
Motivation as given in Figure 7. The format follows
the format of the plan operators given in [21], except
that, for simplicity, we conate the intentional and the
rhetorical levels.7 This plan operator is of course only
meant to be suggestive, and we are not committed to
any details.
Of course, procedure NOT-ACCESSIBLE cru-
cially relies on a proper model of H's attentional state
and on an algorithm that accesses it. We intend to in-
vestigate these issues in future work, but sketch some
possible solutions here. An obvious candidate for the
model is the AWM model used in the simulations it-
self. (In fact, it is quite plausible that speakers use their
own attentional state as a model for that of the hearer.)
The algorithm could then be dened very straightfor-
wardly in terms of a three-dimensional boolean matrix,
indexed on distance in memory, communication cost,
and retrieval cost. The value for a given triple indicates
whether or not information stored at this distance is ac-
cessible. The values in the table are determined using
the simulation environment. Presumably, this process
weakly corresponds to the acquisition of proper text
planning strategies by human agents.
While the AWM model is an obvious candidate for
the model of H's attentional state, certain aspects of
this model do not exactly match some widely believed
and intuitively motivated observations about hierarchi-
cal discourse structure [10, 17]. However, hierarchical
structure interacts with attentional state in ways that
have not been fully explored in the literature to date. In
particular, if a discourse segment consists of a nucleus
with a hierarchically complex satellite that is extremely
long, then a further satellite to the same nucleus may
well require repetition of the nucleus [34]. Neither RST
nor the model of Grosz and Sidner accounts for such
eects. We conclude that it is not a priori obvious that
hierarchical structure contradicts our model. We will
investigate this issue further.
Throughout this paper, we have used the
relation in order to motivate our claims. However, simi-
lar observations apply to other presentational relations,
such as , or as shown in (6):8
(6) a. Clinton has to take a stand on abortion rights
for poor women.
b. He's the president.
Here (6b) is already known to the discourse partic-
ipants, but saying it makes it salient. A discussion of
the relation, however, is complicated by the
need to nd a proper representation of the degree of
strength of belief, since utility theory is not appropri-
ate as a representation of degree of belief [9]. In other
7Moore and Paris argue that for presentational relations
(such as ), there is a one-to-one mapping between
intentional and rhetorical structure. Therefore, conating
them is theoretically justied here.
8We also believe that whether a known proposition is
salient is an issue for supporting content-based inferences,
and thus cognitive modeling may be required for text plan-
ning of subject-matter relations as well.
NAME:
EFFECT: (DESIRE ?hearer (DO ?hearer ?act) ?utility-act)
CONSTRAINTS: (AND (AGENT ?act ?hearer)
(UNREALIZED ?act)
(NOT-ACCESSIBLE ?hearer (UTILITY ?act ?utility-act)))
SATELLITE (BEL ?hearer (UTILITY ?act ?utility-act))
NUCLEUS: (BEL ?hearer (WANT ?speaker (DO ?hearer ?act)))
Figure 7: The plan operator
work, we have developed a version of Gallier's theory
of belief revision which takes into account the eect of
limited working memory on agent's belief revision pro-
cesses [7, 8, 5, 34]. This theory could be used for the
RST relation.
However, the use of a simple evaluation function for
the representation of gradual strengths (of desire, belief,
etc.) is in itself problematic. In this paper, we used the
theoretical construct of utility as the basis for degree
of desire for the relation. However, obser-
vations of human dialogue show that there are many
evaluation functions in the real world that can be the
basis for the relation. Furthermore, these
evaluation functions are incomparable and competing,
as shown by (7), asserted by a speaker while walking to
work:
(7) I don't like going down that way.
It may be shorter, but I don't like it.
The speaker's desire for an aesthetic environment on
her walk has in this case overridden her desire for the
fastest route to work. However if she were late, the
eciency evaluation function might dominate. In the
real world or in real text planning domains, the issue
of multiple competing evaluation functions on poten-
tial intended actions must be addressed. Observe that
this issue is crucially related to the proper theoretical
discussion of presentational relations.
Finally, we would like to observe that there is ev-
idence that the results presented here are domain-
independent. The task that the agents are performing
in Design-World is a simple task without any complex
constraints, which we would expect to be a subcom-
ponent of many other tasks. The model of limited re-
sources we used was cognitively based, but the cost pa-
rameters allow us to model dierent agent architectures,
and we explored the eects of dierent cost parameters.
The Explicit-Warrant strategy is based on simple rela-
tionships between dierent facts which we would expect
to occur in any domain, i.e. the fact that some belief
can be used as a for accepting a proposal
should occur in almost any task. Furthermore, our re-
sults are conrmed by naturally occurring discourses in
a wide variety of domains [37, 4, 34].
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that a text planner that
is based on the notion of communicative intention and
on plan operators that explictly represent such inten-
tions must also incorporate a sophisticated model of
the hearer's attentional state, and the ability to use
this model in order to make decisions about whether
or not to include optional information (satellites of pre-
sentational relations). We have motivated this claim
using naturally occurring dialogues, and by experimen-
tal results from a simulation environment which imple-
ments a simple, but psychologically plausible model of
attentional state. Future work includes extending the
analysis to the whole range of presentational relations,
dening precisely a hearer model that can be used in
text planning and an associated algorithm that can be
used by the plan operators, and a theoretical investi-
gation of the interaction between textual hierarchy and
attentional state.
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